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Don Kerr
University of Western Ontario
Abstract
Building on a Government of Canada
sponsored seminar on Canadian and
international perspectives on youth policy and
research, the Policy Research Initiative (2006)
has highlighted a resurgence of interest among
researchers on the risks, opportunities and
challenges that many young people face across
industrialized countries. Various social,
demographic and economic changes have
altered the life experience of the young, which
has modified the opportunities and risks
encountered in navigating into adult roles.
The objective of this study is to largely describe
some of the most salient of these changes, with
a careful review of existing Canadian literature
and published empirical research. Of particular
interest are important changes in the life course
patterns of the young, in terms of later home
leaving, later completion of education, delayed
full time entrance into the labour force, later
union formation, and later childbearing. We also
review available data sources highlighting
changes on the basis of existing survey and
census data, while carefully considering
evidence as to whether we have encountered
climbing social inequalities among Canadian
youth.
While these delayed life cycle transitions are
becoming increasingly recognized among
researchers and the general public, there is only
a limited amount of research in Canada that
explicitly considers some of the more important
consequences of these changes. For this reason,

the study also reviews the limited empirical
research that has focused on some of these
implications. While the transitions work
properly for most youth, we address a
fundamental research issue raised by the PRI
(2006): what are some of the drivers and
impacts on vulnerable youth populations? We
place these vulnerabilities into the broader
context of population groups that are more
vulnerable: female lone parents, unattached
adults aged 55-64, recent immigrants and
Aboriginal populations. The difficult living
circumstances of these groups can be linked
either directly or indirectly to family and life
cycle questions.
Transitions between youth and adulthood are
structured by a complex system of socioeconomic structures, institutional arrangements
and cultural patterns that can vary in an
important manner across nation states. This
broader context is examined can potentially
provide some insight as to why transitions tend
to be more prolonged in certain settings while
being relatively short in others. The study
includes some international comparisons of
different “transition regimes” and discusses
related policy implications.
Sommaire

À la suite du séminaire parrainé par le
gouvernement du Canada sur les perspectives
canadiennes et internationales sur les politiques et la
recherche concernant les jeunes, le Projet de recherche
sur les politiques (2006) a mis en relief une
recrudescence de l’intérêt des chercheurs pour les
risques, les possibilités et les défis auxquels de
nombreux jeunes sont confrontés dans tous les pays
industrialisés. Divers changements sociaux,
démographiques et économiques ont changé
l’expérience de vie des jeunes, ce qui a modifié les
possibilités et les risques qui les attendent en
assumant des rôles d’adultes.
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L’objectif de cette étude consiste à décrire en termes
généraux certains des changements les plus
importants en passant en revue les études et
recherches empiriques publiées au Canada. Un
intérêt particulier a été accordé aux importants
changements dans les modèles de parcours de vie des
jeunes, qui quittent le domicile parental, terminent
les études, entrent sur le marché du travail à temps
plein, forment des unions et ont des enfants plus
tard. Nous examinons aussi les sources de données
disponibles soulignant les changements selon des
données de sondages et de recensement. Ce faisant,
nous serons attentifs aux indications que les
inégalités sociales seraient à la hausse chez les jeunes
Canadiens.
Bien que ces transitions retardées du parcours de vie
soient de plus en plus reconnues par les chercheurs et
par le grand public, il n’y a que peu de recherches
effectuées au Canada qui se penchent explicitement
sur certaines des principales conséquences de ces
changements. C’est pourquoi cette étude examine
aussi les rares recherches empiriques qui ont porté
sur certaines de ces implications. Bien que les
transitions se passent convenablement pour la
plupart des jeunes, nous abordons une question
fondamentale soulevée par le PRP (2006), à savoir
s’il est possible de cerner les facteurs touchant les
populations plus vulnérables de jeunes et leurs
répercussions. Nous situons ces vulnérabilités dans le
contexte plus vaste des groupes au sein de la
population qui sont plus vulnérables: mères seules,
adultes seuls de 55 à 64 ans, immigrants récents et
Autochtones. Les conditions de vie difficiles de ces
groupes peuvent être reliées soit directement, soit
indirectement à des questions touchant la famille et
le cycle de vie.
Les transitions de la jeunesse à l’âge adulte sont
structurées par un système complexe de structures
socioéconomiques, de dispositifs institutionnels et de
modèles culturels qui peuvent varier de façon
importante entre États-nations. Ce contexte plus
vaste peut aider à comprendre pourquoi les
transitions ont tendance à se prolonger dans certains
4

cas tout en étant relativement courtes dans d’autres.
Cette étude inclus également certaines comparaisons
internationales de différents « régimes de transition »
ainsi qu’une discussion des implications pour les
politiques pertinentes.
1.

Introduction

Building on a Government of Canada
sponsored seminar on Canadian and
international perspectives on youth policy and
research, the Policy Research Initiative (PRI,
2006) has highlighted a resurgence of interest
among researchers on the risks, opportunities,
and challenges that many young people face
across industrialized countries. Various social,
demographic, and economic changes have
altered the life experience of the young, which
has modified the opportunities and risks
encountered in navigating into adult roles. This
working paper describes some of the most
salient of these changes, with a careful review of
existing Canadian literature and published
empirical research. Of particular interest are
important changes in the life-course patterns of
the young, in terms of later home leaving, later
completion of education, delayed full-time
entrance into the labour force, later union
formation, and later childbearing. We also
review available data sources highlighting
changes on the basis of existing survey and
census data, while carefully considering
evidence as to whether we have encountered
rising social inequalities among Canadian youth.
The transitions in the life course associated with
family and work have historically been marked
as delineating adulthood. Due to their policy
importance, these transitions have been the
subject of considerable study by sociologists
and social demographers. As indicated in
Beaujot (2000), there has not only been a delay
in many of these transitions, but these
transitions themselves have become more fluid
and less clear. Since these life-cycle events are
increasingly delayed, the current report shifts
the age boundaries typically used in the

delineation of youth through to older ages
(15-29 years).
The delays over the last four decades are in
marked contrast to previous decades where
transitions occurred at increasingly younger
average ages. In particular, cohorts born
between the world wars experienced a transition
to adulthood that was compressed into a
relatively short period of completing formal
education, entering the labour force, leaving
home, establishing a nuclear household, and
having a first child. For subsequent cohorts, not
only has this standardization broken down, but
the early life-course transitions extend over a
longer period. The sequencing is more diverse
and the events themselves are less clearly
defined.
While researchers and the public increasingly
recognize these delayed life-cycle transitions, a
limited amount of research in Canada explicitly
considers some of the more important
consequences of these changes. For this reason,
the current working paper reviews the limited
empirical research that has focused on some of
these implications. While the transitions work
properly for most youth, we address a
fundamental research issue raised by the PRI
(2006): what are some of the drivers and
impacts on vulnerable youth populations? We
place these vulnerabilities into the broader
context of population groups that are more
vulnerable. Hatfield (2005) proposed that
persistent low income is particularly high for the
following groups: female lone parents,
unattached adults aged 55-64, recent
immigrants, and Aboriginal populations. The
difficult living circumstances of these groups
can be linked either directly or indirectly to
family and life-cycle questions.
The current working paper includes the
following sections:


a theoretical discussion of youth
transition patterns;



a review of empirical data on early adult
transitions (home leaving, union
formation, first childbirth, school
attendance, and employment);



a consideration of these same transitions
for immigrant and Aboriginal youth;



a summary of some of the consequences
of these delays (particularly in terms of
whether youth have become more
fragmented over recent years); and



a summary that draws international
comparisons using a typology on
“transition regimes” and closes with a
discussion on relevant policy
implications.

In terms of theoretical background, we consider
three broad conceptual frameworks, including
the evolution of the life course (Kaplan, 1997),
gender and the division of work in production
and reproduction (Becker, 1991; Oppenheimer,
1988, 1997; Beaujot, 2000), and the second
demographic transition and flexibility in families
(Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2002; Beaujot, 2004).
Our conclusion involves a brief discussion of
policy areas that can potentially be informed by
socio-economic and demographic changes
highlighted in the current report.
2.

Conceptual Background on
the Changing Realities of
Youth

The theoretical basis for studying youth
transition patterns can usefully be placed in
three conceptual frameworks:


the evolution of the human life course;



gender and the division of work in
production and reproduction; and



the second demographic transition and
flexibility in families.
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Evolution of the Human Life Course

Many of our major institutions are built around
the fact that consumption occurs throughout
the life course while production obviously does
not. This lack of congruence between
production and consumption, and the
consequent periods of dependency, underlie
families as a means of transfer and support, as
well as larger kin networks, and various private
and public institutions. For example, consider
the banking system in this context, which exists
due to the need for savings, investments, and
insurance, both private and collective. Stated
differently, the structural constraints on the life
course include consumption and production,
and the associated opportunities and
constraints, as well as societal structures,
policies, and regulations (Corijn, 2001).
Caldwell (2004) proposed that reproductive
partnerships were particularly important in premodern agricultural societies, where families
were units of both production and
reproduction. Industrial societies are less
organized around families, allowing for looser
relationships, more alternate family models,
along with less strict morality on sexuality and
relationships. Reproductive partnerships have
become less important from a macro-economic
point of view, but they largely retain their
significance for children as dependants. A
longer period of juvenile dependence
characterizes family life in industrial societies, as
does longer life expectancies and a substantial
period of post-reproductive productivity. One
reason the period of adolescence and youth has
been extended relates to the need for more
investments in skills, for both men and women.
Kaplan (1997) proposed studying the life course
in terms of maximizing fitness and
consumption. This brings reproductive tradeoffs between early and late reproduction, and
quantity and quality of offspring. In his theory
of the evolution of the human life course,
Kaplan (1997) made the case that greater
efficiency in production is achieved at the
expense of a longer period of childhood and
adolescent dependence. Productivity then
6

continues over a longer life span, beyond the
ages at which reproduction takes place. Postreproductive productivity permits transfers to
the younger generation as they enter adult ages,
and thus supports their reproduction.
Historically, this often involved offspring living
with grandparents for given periods. Thus, even
at typical ages for starting reproduction, given
the additional transfers of reproduction itself,
there is dependence on older post-reproductive
individuals who remain productive. Various
stages of the human life course have long been
dynamically interrelated and, of course, this
remains the case in modern societies.
In a competitive world, intergenerational
transfers are particularly important to the
opportunities of youth. While there are
complaints about KIPPERS (Kids In Parents’
Pockets Eroding Retirement Savings), young
people benefit from more transfers from
parents and transfers over a longer period.
Youth will be vulnerable if they profit less from
these transfers and if they have insufficient
investments in themselves before transiting to
their own family and work.
Gender and the Division of Work in
Production and Reproduction

The context of the life course takes on different
dimensions depending on the gender division of
labour in families. If we consider that the main
activities of families include earning a living and
caring for each other, then it matters how these
activities are divided by gender (Beaujot, 2000;
Beaujot and Liu, 2005). The dynamics will be
rather different in families based on traditional
“complementary roles” (e.g., the traditional
breadwinner model), as compared to what some
have called “new families” (based on a twoworker model with a more symmetrical division
of paid and unpaid work). In appreciating this
fact, a gender perspective can be considered key
to understanding both the evolution of the
family life course as well as the timing of both
union formation and reproduction in the
contemporary context.

When there was specialization, with men
focusing on economic production and women
on reproduction, there was probably less need
for women to delay family function. As long as
young men had good economic opportunities,
marriages could take place at a relatively early
age. This situation characterized the baby boom
era in Canada, when female labour force
participation was relatively low and the
economic opportunities for young men were
improving. In the 1950s, there was no great
need for a particularly long period of education
beyond the teenage years. Paid work and family
care were both considered full-time jobs,
although this complementary-roles model of
marriage brought some risk for women and
children. In the absence of labour market
experience, women were much more likely to
marry and have children at a relatively young
age, although this placed them in a particularly
vulnerable position since complementary roles
lacked insurance against the loss of the
breadwinner.
In “Gender Equity in Theories of Fertility
Transition,” McDonald (2000) proposed that
women’s power and status increased in families,
even when their status was low in the broader
society. Women’s status in families was
especially enhanced when they came to have
better control over their own reproduction. In
contrast, women’s status in families and,
consequently, also outside of families is
particularly low when they have no control over
their own marital and parental status. Similarly,
Folbre (2000) saw the gender change over the
past century as women’s increasing ability to
make decisions on relationships and
childbearing, based on self-interest. This was
linked to the promotion of equal opportunities
within the family for the education of girls and
boys, as gender has essentially disappeared as an
ascriptive factor in determining levels of
education (Wanner, 1999). Over more recent
decades, new family arrangements have become
more prevalent, as both men and women set
out to optimize their lifetime economic
production. As both genders seek to obtain the
skills necessary in establishing themselves in the

labour force, young adults are more likely to
postpone reproduction and other early life
transitions. Over the last several decades, the
labour force participation of women with and
without children has risen by a substantial
degree, while that of men actually declined
somewhat.
It would appear that childbearing is particularly
low in societies where women have approached
equal status in the non-family institutions of
society (in education and the labour market),
but where mothers carry an excessive burden
within the family (McDonald, 1997; Chesnais,
1996). Faced with a choice between high status
in the labour force and low status in families,
women are prompted to have “no families”
(Goldscheider and Waite, 1991). Berk (1985)
used the concept of families as a gender factory
to highlight the way the division of labour in
households promoted gender differentiation.
Subsequently, these changes in gender roles led
many women to delay or completely forgo
marriage and childbearing altogether. However,
some “new men” have come to see the value of
productive roles for both women and men, of
maintaining relationships based on equality, and
of sharing in unpaid work as a form of
mutuality (Coltrane, 1995).
Oppenheimer (1988) proposed a “theory of
marriage timing” that considers how union
formation is related to the opportunity
structures of both men and women; if these
opportunities are somewhat comparable,
marriages are more likely to occur when both
men and women have higher achieved status. In
particular, Oppenheimer (1997) attributed the
delay in marriage to the difficulty that young
men have had in establishing their work lives,
and to the importance attached to the work
lives of both spouses. That is, young adults will
search longer for a spouse if there is a longer
period of uncertainty before each person’s
economic future can be predicted. In a
qualitative survey that asked when it was best to
start a union or get married, respondents from
London, Ontario, largely said that it was best to
wait until education is completed, and work
7

lives are being established (Beaujot, 2000). That
is, given the importance of work to a couple’s
lifestyle, the delayed entry into relationships
follows on the longer period of education and
the difficulty in establishing secure jobs. In
other words, the continuity of past gender
patterns appears to persist for many couples,
particularly in terms of occupational choice,
where women continue to be much more likely
than men to select jobs that permit more
flexibility for raising children (Ranson, 1995,
1998).
Other constraints on young adults include the
decreased value of youth labour over recent
years, and the disadvantaged situation of
cohorts that have followed the baby boom.
Many structural factors appear to promote the
“new family” or “collaborative model” for the
division of earning and caring activities, where
permanent relationships start after both
partners establish their career trajectories. In the
two-worker model, with its dual agendas of
work and family, there are further constraints
on the early life transitions of both women and
men. In the contemporary context, youth will
be vulnerable if they form reproductive
relationships before establishing the secure basis
for two-income families. Early marriage or
cohabitation and childbearing typically imply a
lower level of education and fewer
opportunities in the labour market. For women
and children not in two-income families, this is
often associated with economic hardship and
poverty.
The Second Demographic Transition
and Flexibility in Families

The concept of the second demographic
transition has especially been used to interpret
the fertility trends of the past 40 years. The first
transition, from about 1870 to 1945, brought
smaller families, especially because of changes in
the economic costs and benefits of children,
along with a cultural environment that made it
more appropriate to control family size. The
second transition since the mid-1960s, has been
linked to a continuation of low fertility, a
further tendency to delay births, as well as an
8

increased flexibility in marital relationships
(Lesthaeghe, 1995; Beaujot, 2000: 85-96).
The most obvious indicators of increased
flexibility are seen in the means of entry and exit
from relationships. Divorce as a means of exit
from relationships was first envisioned as a
solution to extreme problems in a marriage, and
the presence of children was often an important
reason not to divorce (Keyfitz, 1994: 7). The
norms have since changed to the point that
people consider a good divorce as better than a
bad marriage (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1988). In
addition, this increased flexibility is also seen in
change in the acceptability of premarital sex and
cohabitation. Cohabitation was to eventually
transform premarital relationships, just as it has
come to transform marital relationships
themselves. Le Bourdais and Lapierre-Adamcyk
(2004) proposed that in Quebec cohabitation is
becoming an alternative to marriage in the sense
of being a lasting arrangement in which to raise
children, while outside of Quebec it has become
a socially acceptable living arrangement, so
becoming a parent is no longer restricted to
marriage.
The contrasts between the first and second
demographic transitions suggest important
differences in the relevance of children to social
cohesion (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2002).
Lesthaeghe and Neels (2002) proposed that the
first demographic transition saw increased social
cohesion, while the second demographic
transition is linked to a weakening role of
families in social cohesion. The first transition is
associated with the economic development that
brought higher standards of living and
aspirations for increased consumption. The
cultural side of this transition included the
legitimacy of deliberate control over births, but
it also included a uniform family model based
on prudent marriage and responsible
parenthood. The second transition is linked
with secularization and the growing importance
placed on individual autonomy. Thus, the family
model predominant at mid-century based on
intact marriages gave way to a diversity of family

types corresponding to the interest in autonomy
and post-material aspirations.
During the first transition, the structural and
cultural conditions included strong
identification with a homogeneous family type
whereas the second transition involved a
weakening in this identification, given the
greater importance of individual autonomy.
Childbearing was increasingly seen as a means
of individual gratification (Ariès, 1980; Giddens,
1991). In particular, the second demographic
transition includes a weakening of the norms
against divorce, premarital sex, cohabitation,
and voluntary childlessness. That is, there is a
greater focus on individual rights along with less
regulation of the private lives of individuals by
the larger community (Thornton, 2001). Yet
despite these changes, there has also been
continuity, as for example, the division of
domestic labour between couples continues to
be “very much gendered” regardless of being
married or cohabiting (Kerr et al., 2006). While
the second demographic transition has meant
greater plurality and diversity, these changes
hold important implications for women, men,
and children, some for the better and some for
the worse. For women, it has meant that,
compared to men, they are less likely to be in a
relationship later in life, and they are more likely
to be with children. That is, they are less likely
to have the support of a partner, and they are
more likely to care for dependent children. On
the other hand, men are less likely to have
lifelong relationships of emotional exchange
with their children. For children, it means less
stability in parenting.
Some have proposed that diversity can include
bifurcation wherein some young people benefit
from the quality support of two earning and
caring parents, while others, especially if they
are born to young parents, are less likely to have
the support of two parents, and their parents
may be hard pressed to meet the earning and
caring needs (McLanahan, 2004). That is, initial
disadvantages encourage further demographic
patterns that enhance the disadvantages. In
elaborating on the links between demographic

and socio-economic vulnerability, Kiernan
(2002: 84-95) observed a “long arm of
demography” in the sense that family
demographics are differentiated based on the
extent to which individuals are disadvantaged.
This selectivity has further implications for
subsequent vulnerability. Kiernan paid
particular attention to youthful parenthood,
unmarried families, and parental separation and
divorce, as demographics that are linked to
disadvantage.
3.

Early Adult Transitions

Events associated with the transition to
adulthood (home leaving, completion of
education, full-time employment, union
formation, and childbearing) have generally
been studied separately rather than in
conjunction with one another. Despite this fact,
the various indicators on these transitions (e.g.,
the average age at which persons marry or agespecific fertility rates) have all moved in the
same direction over the past several decades, in
Canada and across most industrialized societies.
Adolescence and young adulthood appear to
have become more delayed, protracted and less
orderly than in the past. Recent changes in the
timing on these intertwined and interdependent
life-cycle events imply that the transition to
adulthood has become increasingly extended
well into the third decade of life.
In summarizing American research, Furstenberg
(2000) highlighted the substantial proportion of
young adults whose transition to adulthood
appears to continue well into their latter 20s and
even early 30s. Needless to say, these changes
carry profound implications for society, as
young adults take longer to establish themselves
residentially, economically, in full-time
employment, as well as to form their own
families. As Mitchell (2006) noted, this is even
more complicated by the fact that transitions to
adulthood also appear to be less permanent and
subject to reversibility. The PRI (2006) pointed
to what it considers the prolonged, complex,
fragmented and often non-linear nature of
transitions for young people today relative to
previous generations.
9

As young adults prolong their schooling and
delay full-time employment, some, yet obviously
not all, continue to receive support from
parents, making a protracted period of semidependence across generations. This semidependence manifests itself in the growing
proportion of young Canadians who delay
establishing their own households, and on
moving out, the significant proportion who
return home on either a temporary or extended
basis.
Leaving Home

Young people are far more likely to live at home
if they are studying full time, are unemployed,
are single and/or have relatively low earnings
through their labour force involvement.
Similarly, once a person enters into a
relationship, whether through marriage or
cohabitation, they are much less likely to live
with their parents (even in the event of
separation/divorce). In appreciating the extent
to which these life-cycle events are associated, it
is not surprising that the median age at home
leaving has risen steadily over recent decades.
As Canadians increasingly delay employment,
extend their studies and delay
marriage/cohabitation, they are less likely to
move from their parent’s home.
For the cohort of baby boomers aged 50-54 in
2005, the average age at home leaving was only
about 21.5 years for men and only 19.9 years for
women (Beaujot, 2000). In contrast, consider
Figure 1, which provides information on the
percentage of young adults living at home, by
single years of age, in both 1991 and 2001. The
2001 Census showed that fully 50 percent of all
men were still living at home at about the age of
24, whereas roughly 50 percent of women were
still living at home at about the age of 22.5.
Relative to earlier decades, the proportion of
young adults continuing to live with parents has
continued to climb, and this shift toward older
ages has been equally true for both men and
women. By the age of 29, one in five men still
live with their parent(s), while roughly one in
ten women are in the same situation.

10

Most researchers focus on various economic
factors associated with a delay in home leaving.
Establishing an independent residence is largely
seen as a critical step in the transition to
adulthood, in marking a shift from some forms
of dependence to greater economic autonomy
(Goldscheider and Goldscheider, 1999). In their
explanation of why young people delay this sort
of autonomy, Lapierre-Adamcyk et al. (1995)
paid particular attention to the more difficult
economic times that young people have faced
over recent decades, as young men in particular
experienced downward pressures on earnings.
In addition, young women appear increasingly
to be pursuing strategies that resemble those of
men, seeking to put off establishing their own
households and families to give priority to their
work status. Goldscheider and Goldscheider
(1993) supplemented this explanation by
considering how cultural factors have made
parental homes more suitable to older children.
For example, generation gaps appear to have
narrowed and parents have established more
egalitarian relationships with their children.
Figure 1: Youth Living with Parents
(%), by Age and Sex (1991-2001)
Males

Females

Source: Statistics Canada, Canadian Census, Public Use
Files, 1991, 2001.

This tendency of young adults to live with their
parents is at least partially due to an increased
tendency for young people to return home after
having already left home for school, to establish
a union or obtain employment. Mitchell (2006)
referred to these returnees as “boomerang
kids,” defined as leaving and returning for a
minimum of a four-month spell. The 2001
General Social Survey (GSS) provides
information on the home-leaving process, and
demonstrates the extent to which leaving the
parental home does not preclude returning. For
example, in working with this definition, about
33 percent of men and 28 percent of women
aged 20 to 29 returned home at least once after
an initial departure.
Late home leaving and returning to the parental
home have often been discussed in negative
terms. For instance, Boyd and Pryor (1989)
referred to the “cluttered nest.” In some
regards, this delay is counter to the “idea of
progress” underlying family trends, as implied
by the growth of individualism. Leaving home
and establishing an independent residence is
considered a critical step in the transition to
adulthood, in shifting from some forms of
dependence to greater autonomy. This is a
cultural norm.
Making international comparisons, Palomba
(2001) suggested that very late departures may

be detrimental to the independence of young
people. Contrasts across countries suggest that
home leaving is later when children depend on
transfers within the family, and earlier if there
are more state transfers, as in Nordic countries
(Reher, 1998; Breen and Buchmann, 2002;
Iacovou, 2002). For cohorts born around 1960,
the median age at men’s home leaving ranges
from 26 or 27 years in Italy and Spain, to 20
years in Sweden (Billari et al., 2001).
Independence from parents at affordable costs
is reduced when there is a poor housing market
and a lack of rental accommodation. In
contrast, greater social transfers to young
people, as occurs in Sweden, allow more
independence from parents. In light of some of
these differences, this recent shift toward
delayed home leaving may be considered
problematic to the extent to which the young
are blocked in terms of establishing
independence. Allahar and Côté (1998) spoke of
a category of vulnerable youth who appear to
“waste their time” rather than becoming
independent adults. One hears of 30 year olds
who require more time to establish themselves
and actually think about what to do with their
life. There are obviously consequences of this
prolonged period before “full adulthood,” as
many youth continue with educational pursuits,
job exploration, and experimentation with
romantic relationships, while continuing to rely
on parents for housing support.
Some youth may make their transitions too late
and others make them too early. Early home
leaving is sometimes problematic, as for
example, in cases where there are problems for
completion of high school, establishing savings,
and receiving transfers from parents. Bernhardt
et al. (2003) found that early home leaving is
linked to lower educational aspirations and
lower educational attainment. This is
particularly the case when the departure is due
to a push factor, such as family conflict. These
early departures lead to a reduction in the
quantity and quality of contact with both
parents, and have negative consequences for
successful career patterns and stable families.
Obviously, the implications of delayed home
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leaving depend on the extent to which extra
time is devoted to accumulating human and
financial capital. In particular, a delay in leaving
home allows youth to invest longer in
themselves and to profit longer from transfers
from their parents, thus permitting transitions
that benefit the individual.
School Attendance

The minimum qualification for employment in
Canada is generally considered the high school
diploma. This certification permits further
opportunities in terms of both education and
establishing oneself in the labour market. Most
youth in Canada succeed in obtaining this
degree. Data from 2003 suggest that about 75
percent of young Canadians have their high
school diploma by the age of 18 (Shaienks et al.,
2006). Among those who drop out, many
eventually take an indirect route to graduation,
such that by the age of 22 the high school
graduation rate increases to 90 percent, an all
time high in Canada. The economic situation
among youth in Canada who do not succeed in
high school is obviously very difficult. For
example, Bowlby (2005) estimated a 19 percent
unemployment rate in 2002 for high school
drop-outs aged 20-24. This is a particularly
vulnerable group of youth, with long-term
difficulties anticipated given the fundamental
role of skills and knowledge in fully
participating in the economic and social life of
Canada.
The transition to the completion of formal
education is somewhat difficult to mark,
because the future may bring a return to the
classroom (e.g., eventually returning to high
school after dropping out as a teenager). Yet
there can be no doubt that participation rates
are up considerably, for both college and
university attendance, as a growing proportion
of youth seek post-secondary credentials. In
1961, only eight percent of 20-24 year olds
attended a post-secondary educational
institution. This increased to 41.6 percent by
1991 and fully 48.5 percent by 2001. As
demonstrated in Figure 2, across most ages,
participation rates have risen in terms of both
12

college and university attendance in Canada,
when comparing the 1993-1994 and 2003-2004
academic years. While college participation rates
are down slightly for teenagers, university
participation rates are up. Among young adults
in their early 20s, both college and university
participation rates are up. The completion of
formal education occurs at older and older ages,
as young adults take advantage of an extended
period to gain human capital for entrance into
the labour force, or as they better position
themselves in relation to others in a difficult
labour market. At the age of 25 years, almost
one in six young adults still attend university or
college. At the age of 29, about one in ten
continue with their post-secondary education.
The tremendous growth in the number of postsecondary graduates over recent decades,
reflects the demand for skills in the Canadian
economy. No other OECD nation has a higher
proportion of youth attending university and
college (OECD, 2002). According to the 2001
Census, 28 percent of all individuals aged 25-34
in 2001 had university qualifications, 21 percent
held a college diploma, and another 12 percent
had trade credentials. In all, 61 percent of
individuals in this age group had qualifications
beyond high school. In comparison, at the time
of the 1991 Census, 49 percent of those aged
25-34 had post-secondary credentials. Other
comparisons show that Canada has particularly
high enrolment rates at ages 18-21, but by age
24 is at about the middle of OECD countries
(Fussell, 2002).
The downside of this shift in educational
qualifications is that a growing proportion of
Canadians are underemployed relative to their
qualifications. Li et al. (2006) recently estimated
that nearly one out of every five people in the
work force with a university education works in
a job that requires, at most, high school
education. In drawing comparisons over time, it
was estimated that the number of universityeducated workers who were overqualified in
such a manner increased by nearly one third in
2001 relative to 1993.

Figure 2: Participation Rates at the
College and University Levels, Canada,
1993-1994 and 2003-2004
Participation Rate at the College Level

Participation Rate at the University
Level

Source: Statistics Canada. 2005. Education indicators in
Canada: Report of the Pan-Canadian Education Indicators
Program. Catalogue no. 81-582-XIE. Ottawa.

A 2002 survey on educational planning found
that most parents (93 percent) expect their
children to pursue post-secondary studies, while
75 percent expect a university degree (Shipley et
al., 2003). Yet only half of these parents were
making savings to help their children, with
another 30 percent reporting that they planned
to start saving in the future. The savings of
parents are often small in comparison to the
actual cost of post-secondary education,
particularly in a context of climbing tuition fees.
Not surprisingly, many youth rely on loans and
bursaries to cover basic expenses, such that
about one half of college graduates and
bachelor graduates leave school owing money
for their education, mostly in the form of
government student loans (Allen and
Vaillancourt, 2004). While a majority of
graduates did not report difficulties paying their

debt, about one fourth of bachelor graduates
and almost a third of college graduates reported
difficulties with repayment. A small, but notable
proportion of graduates completed their
education with large debts. About 14 percent of
students graduating with bachelor degrees
owed $25,000 or more in government student
loans (Allen and Vaillancourt, 2004).
In charting the transition from high school to
post-secondary education and the labour
market, Table 1 provides information on the
distribution of the population aged 15-29 by
education level and labour force participation.
For example, at the age of 15, the overwhelming
majority in 2003-2004 were studying and not in
the labour force (70 percent), about one in four
(24.6 percent) were combining their studies with
employment, while relatively few were either
not studying or in the labour force (2.4 percent),
not studying yet working (1.1 percent), or fast
tracked into college (1.1 percent). By the age of
20, about half were no longer studying (i.e., 35.8
percent working, 6.4 percent unemployed, and
an additional 5.8 percent neither studying nor
part of the labour force). Since there is so much
pressure on young people to obtain postsecondary credentials, it is not surprising that so
many youth take the strenuous route of
combining their studies with part-time or even
full-time employment, true of both college and
university students.
As educational enrolment involves a high
degree of dependence, young people of both
genders are considerably more likely to continue
living with a parent, as well as delay other
fundamental life-cycle transitions. Survey
research documented normative expectations
that young people attending school should not
consider marriage or childbearing until
completion of their schooling and entrance into
the labour market (Blossfeld, 1995). Women’s
increased education delays union formation for
both genders, but childbearing is delayed
beyond what would be expected simply on the
basis of educational enrolment. This is reflected
in available statistics: while longer schooling is
clearly involved in the delay of early life
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Table 1: Distribution of the Population Aged 15 to 29 by Education Level, Labour Force
Status, and Age, Canada, 2003-2004
Age
15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

15 to 29

Non-student NILF1
2.4
2.5
2.9
4.6
5.7
5.8
5.4
6.2
6.8
7.3
8.1
9.1
9.3
9.0
Non-student unemployed
0.3
1.1
2.4
4.8
6.2
6.4
6.2
7.1
7.4
6.4
6.9
6.1
6.0
5.7
Non-student employed
1.3
2.5
6.2
20.3
27.7
35.8
41.6
46.2
54.0
62.8
67.7
70.9
71.8
74.6
University employed
0.0
0.0
0.5
5.9
10.7
12.7
14.2
13.5
9.7
8.3
5.2
4.2
4.3
3.9
University NILF1
0.0
0.0
1.0
10.9
13.9
14.8
13.8
12.1
8.7
5.9
4.6
2.9
2.6
1.9
College employed
0.0
0.0
5.8
13.5
16.5
13.0
10.4
8.1
6.9
4.5
3.4
3.8
2.8
2.2
College NILF1
1.1
1.5
5.4
9.2
10.1
7.8
6.6
5.4
5.4
3.5
2.8
2.3
2.5
2.0
Primary/secondary employed
24.6
38.3
39.7
17.1
4.4
1.9
0.8
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
1
Primary/secondary NILF
70.0
53.3
35.9
13.8
4.9
1.5
0.7
0.5
0.6
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Total
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: 1. NILF = Not in the labour force.
Source: Statistics Canada. 2005. Education Indicators in Canada: Report of the Pan-Canadian Education Indicators Program. Catalogue no. 81-582-XIE. Ottawa.

8.8
5.9
75.3
2.9
1.7
3.0
2.0
0.0
0.0
100.0

6.3
5.3
44.1
6.5
6.4
6.5
4.5
8.5
11.8
100.0

%

transitions, it is noteworthy that for men the
median age of school completion for the 19711975 cohort was 21.5 years, while that of first
union was more than 25 years, and first
childbirth over 31 years (extending the trends
from older cohorts shown in Ravanera et al.,
2002: 299). Similarly, women of the 1971-1975
cohort completed their education at a median
age of 21.8 years, compared to 23 years for first
union and about 28 years for birth of first child
(Ravanera et al., 1998: 187-189). Women’s
longer education may delay men’s entry into
first unions, but childbearing seems to be
delayed beyond the ages when education is
completed for both genders.
Into the Labour Force

The transition from school into the labour force
typically takes place over a number of years, as
young people who are still students begin
working part time. The OECD (1997) suggested
that the starting age of the school-to-work
transition be estimated as the last age at which
more than 75 percent of youths only attend
school. The end of this transition would occur
when more than half only work. In applying this
classification, the school-to-work transition now
takes place over a more extended period, as an
increased proportion of young people continue
to pursue their education well into their 20s (see
Table 1). While the average age in which young
people begin this transition has not changed
noticeably over recent decades (at roughly age
16), the pursuit of college and university
credentials has pushed the end of this
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transitional period toward ages that have
historically been associated with working,
marriage, and childbearing.
As indicated in Table 1, the school-to-work
transition starts at about the age of 16. For
example, roughly 38.3 percent of 16 year olds
were combining their studies with employment.
In 2003-2004, the end of this transition
appeared to occur at about age 23, with 54
percent of young adults employed and not
studying. In considering previous data from
Statistics Canada, Bowlby (2000) indicated that
this transitional period, while starting at about
age 16 in the early 1980s, ended at about the age
of 21 years (i.e., this transitional period was only
about five years relative to about seven years in
2003-2004). The Canadian labour market has
changed noticeably over the last several
decades, including important changes in the
skills required for entrance-level jobs –
explaining the rising propensity to pursue postsecondary studies.
With these changes, the likelihood of full-time
employment actually declined among young
men not studying, relative to earlier cohorts.
Without an education, young adults have a
particularly difficult time in establishing
themselves, as the Canadian economy and
occupational structure have moved into a “postindustrial economic order” (Myles et al., 1993:
171); Clement and Myles, 1994). This has
involved a shift from manufacturing to an
economic system based on the production of
knowledge goods and personal services.

Education is fundamental in the adaptation to
these changes, for the skill requirements of the
typical job have increased over recent years
(Baer, 1999; Bernard et al., 1997).

Table 2: Full-Time Employment and
Earnings, 1976-2001

Morissette (2002) documented how the
proportion of male non-students aged 16-24
working full time declined, from 77.6 percent in
1981 to 69.1 percent by 2001 (see Table 2).
Among women, a less pronounced decline
occurred, from 61 to 56.3 percent. At ages 2529, there were again declines for men, from 88.1
percent working full time in 1981 to 83.8
percent in 2001. At this age group, women
made significant gains, from 50.9 to 66.2
percent working full time. Morissette (2002)
also provided data on the declining earnings
among young men, employed full time, full year,
while female youth witnessed a general stability
in earnings. The earnings of older men and
women managed to increase somewhat while
those of younger age groups either stagnated or
declined – indicative of climbing inequalities
across age groups.
Other studies demonstrated how the proportion
of youth working, the hours worked per week,
and the wages per hour, all declined relative to
older men (Morissette, 1998; Picot, 1998). The
relative economic position of youth, particularly
young men, declined throughout the 1980s and
1990s, despite the fact that they had higher
credentials in terms of education. The
explanation for this decline is complex, as the
Canadian work force has become more
polarized by the unequal distribution of
earnings and hours among workers of different
age and skill levels. More recently, Morissette
documented a modest reversal in these trends,
as young adults fared slightly better in 2000 than
they did five years earlier in 1995 (Table 2). For
example, the percentage of full-time
employment among male non-student youth
16-24 bottomed out during the mid-1990s (at
66.5 percent) before recovering somewhat
according to the 2001 Census (up to 69.1
percent).

Source: Morissette (2002).

Other studies confirmed the disadvantage of
younger men, especially in comparison to older
men (Morissette, 1998; Picot, 1998). These
disadvantages are relevant in explaining the
timing of other fundamental life-cycle
transitions, from home leaving to marriage and
childbearing. Openheimer and Lewin (1999)
argued that the transition to marriage depends
on men’s earnings and their career mobility.
Tanner and Yabiku (1999) concluded that the
transition of contemporary youth to adulthood
is not delayed because they have different goals,
as the goal of a stable job remains dominant.
Economic realities frustrate their achievement
of these goals. Demographic realities may also
play a role, as cohorts following the large baby
boom generation have been disadvantaged
(Beaujot and Kerr, 2004: 186-189).
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Union Formation

As with leaving home, completing school and
entering the labour market, Canadian youth are
also delaying union formation. The
aforementioned downward pressure on
earnings, particularly for young men, is often
emphasized in explanation. However, the
indeterminancy of these types of relationships
complicates the understanding of the meaning
and character of these sorts of transitions and
how they have been changing over time.
Common-law relationships have yet to be
shaped by the same consensual norms or formal
laws that now characterize the institution of
marriage. The fluidity of union formation that
includes not only marriage but also cohabitation
is matched by the fluidity of other transitions,
such as that of home leaving, with the greater
predominance of returning home.
There are delays in marriage and in union
formation more generally. The median age at
first marriage declined from 23.0 years for
brides and 26.3 years for grooms in 1941, to just
over 21 and 23 years respectively for those
marrying in the early 1970s, then increased to
median ages of 28.2 and 30.2 by 2001 (Beaujot
and Kerr, 2004: 212). Part of the delay in
marriage can be attributed to a larger proportion
entering unions through cohabitation. For
instance, 63 percent of first unions among
women aged 20-29 in 2001 were common-law
rather than marriages (Statistics Canada, 2002).
Strong differences across the last several
censuses occur in terms of the percentage in
union, as both young men and women delay
marriage and cohabitation. This is well
represented in Figure 3, which portrays the
percentage of youth either cohabiting or
married by single years of age in 1991 and 2001,
demonstrating this shift toward older ages. For
example, the percentage of 25 year olds in union
(married or cohabiting) was higher in 1991 than
in 2001. Among young men, this percentage
declined from about 38 percent to only 32
percent; among young women, this percentage
declined from about 55 to 46 percent.

16

Common-law unions take on a variety of forms,
from those that are the equivalent to marriage
to those that might better be seen as an
alternative to living single. For some couples,
cohabitation continues to be largely viewed as
merely a prelude to marriage, whereas for
others, cohabitation has become almost
indistinguishable from marriage (at least to the
casual observer). As cohabitation has become
widespread, various types of cohabiting unions
co-exist, including those that involve less
committed couples (Turcotte and Bélanger,
1997). Some involve a day-to-day sharing of
responsibilities and expenses, whereas others
involve relatively little interdependence. Even
further, in following the life course of specific
individuals, it is obvious that the expectations
and commitment that persons bring to their
relationships may change in an important
manner over time. For example, what begins as
a convenient sharing of living expenses with
very little commitment may very well evolve
into a trial marriage, a setting for childbearing
and eventually, into a relationship sanctioned by
legal marriage itself (Seltzer, 2004).
While common-law unions take on a variety of
forms, from those that are the equivalent to
marriage to those that might better be seen as
an alternative to living single, two things are
clear. First, common-law unions are twice as
likely to end in separation as first marriages
(Statistics Canada, 2002). Also, cohabitation
postpones marriage and is correlated with lower
marital stability. Wu (1999) proposed that
cohabitation delays marriage not only because
people who are marrying have a longer period
of premarital relationships, but also because
persons who cohabit are less likely to be
searching actively for a marital partner, which
further delays marriage timing if the relationship
does not work out.

Figure 3: Percentage of Married or
Cohabiting, by Age and Sex, 1991-2001
Males

Females

Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use Files, 1991, 2001.

Looking at the situation in the United States
before 1980, Goldscheider and Waite (1986)
suggested that men with more achieved status
are more likely to “buy marriage” as part of the
package, while women may use their higher
education and occupational status to “buy out
of marriage.” However, with most relationships
taking the form of the two-worker model,
achieved status has since come to increase the
likelihood of marriage for both men and women
(Goldscheider and Waite, 1991; Sweeney, 1997).
Canadian results show a similar situation,
implying shifting dynamics associated with
forming relationships. Using the 1995 General

Social Survey, Turcotte and Goldscheider
(1998) found that more highly educated women
from pre-1950 cohorts were less likely to marry,
but the opposite applies in the post-1950
cohorts. For men of both cohorts, education is
positively related to entry into unions, but the
relationship has declined in importance. Among
more recent cohorts, uncertainties at work as
measured through significant work interruptions
reduce men’s likelihood of marriage, and they
increase the likelihood that women will cohabit
rather than marry.
Given that union formation increasingly
requires the earning power of both partners, we
can expect to see an increased importance of
education to women’s entry into marriage, while
employment status becomes more important to
entry into any type of union. In Quebec, where
cohabitation is particularly high, women’s
employment increases their likelihood of
forming a common-law union (Bélanger and
Turcotte, 1999). In their analysis, Turcotte and
Goldscheider (1998) found that working has
become more important for entering any kind
of union, since union formation increasingly
requires the earning power of both partners.
Thus, the labour market disadvantages of young
men reduce union formation, while young
women have become more aware of the labour
market disadvantages of early parenthood.
Oppenheimer (1988) did not attribute the delay
of marriage to fewer gains associated with
marriage, nor to an independence hypothesis
wherein women with more status would use
that status to remain more independent.
Instead, Oppenheimer (1988, 1997) attributed
the delay to the difficulty young men have had
in establishing their work lives, and to the
importance attached to the work lives of both
spouses. That is, young adults will search longer
for a spouse if there is a longer period of
uncertainty before their economic future is
defined.
Besides these economic questions, marriage
may pose a different priority for young people.
In “Sure, I’d Like to Get Married ... Someday,”
White (1999: 57) suggested that there is a
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Figure 4: Fertility Rate by Age Group, 1972-2003

Source: Bélanger (2005).

“worldwide retreat from marriage,” as men
know that marriage requires greater
commitment to a stable work life, and as
women know they cannot depend on the
stability of the union. However, survey evidence
would suggest that young people attach much
importance to living in a stable relationship
(Lapierre-Adamcyk, 1990). Attitudes and values
clearly play a role in the entry into cohabitations
and marriages, but these attitudes indicate
strong expectations and preferences to enter
relationships (Milan, 2003). That is, the delay
would not be associated with a retreat from
relationships, but rather with the complexity of
achieving two rewarding jobs and a stable
relationship.
First Childbirth

While there is a certain fluidity to home leaving
and union formation, making the transition
difficult to mark, the same does not apply to the
transition to parenthood, especially for women.
The transition to parenthood involves much
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change in people’s lives, and is highly significant
because of the associated permanence and
obligation. One can have ex-spouses and exjobs but not ex-children. Even for men,
parenthood is one of the most permanent
commitments (Rindfuss et al., 1988).
The delay in childbearing has brought
reductions in fertility; the average age of women
at first birth, increased from about 23 in 1976 to
at least 28 by 2003 (Lochhead, 2000; Bélanger,
2005). In 1976, only nine percent of first-time
mothers were aged 30 or more, but this applied
to more than 35 percent by 2003. Over cohorts,
the median age of men at their first birth was
26.5 in the 1941-45 birth cohort, compared to
31.2 in the 1961-65 cohort (Beaujot, 2000: 97).
For women, this median age increased from
23.3 in the 1941-45 cohort to 27.8 in the
1966-70 cohort.
The delay in childbearing can also be seen in
available time series on age-specific fertility rates

(see Figure 4). Over the last 30 years, the most
pronounced decline in age-specific fertility
occurred among women aged 20-24, which
declined from about 120 births per 1,000
women in 1973 to only 52.7 births per 1,000
women by 2003. Throughout this period,
fertility rates declined consistently for women
under the age of 30, whereas fertility rose for
women in their 30s, and remained relatively
stable for women in their 40s. Fertility rates at
ages 15-19, 20-24 and, to a lesser extent, 25-29
recently declined to their lowest level in
decades. During the 1960s, the age group 20-24
actually had the highest fertility rate in Canada,
but it has since been bypassed by age group 2529. On the other hand, since the mid-1970s,
fertility has increased among women in their
30s. This trend toward older women having
children breaks with the long-term trends
associated with the first demographic transition,
where fertility declined first among older
women and, in particular, among women over
35.
The delay in childbearing can also be seen in the
reductions in fertility for women aged 15-19,
across a number of countries (Teitler, 2002:
142). There are also important variations, with
Canada’s rate being significantly lower than that
of the United States, but similar to the United
Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia, and
higher than that of many European countries.
For instance, the birth rate at ages 15-19 is close
to 5 per 1,000 women in the Netherlands and
Sweden, compared to 16 in Canada and 49 in
the United States. The Canadian rates declined
from 34.0 births per 1,000 women in 1976. This
is not a function of delays in the age of first
intercourse, which has been declining for both
sexes, reaching a median age of about 16 to 17
years (Teitler, 2002: 136). In the Canadian case,
about half of conceptions to teenagers are
aborted (Dryburgh, 2000).
The changed age pattern of childbearing, or the
delay of fertility, has largely been associated with
women’s increased education and labour force
participation. Particularly in the period 19631989, Rindfuss and his colleagues (1996)

observed that women with a college education
experienced dramatic shifts toward later ages at
childbearing. Looking at variations in the length
of male parenting, Ravanera and Rajulton
(2000) found that men of higher status start
later and finish sooner. Lochhead (2000: 42)
observed that the distribution of first births
shifts further to higher ages for women who
have more education. He pointed especially to
powerful economic and career incentives to
delay childbirth and family formation, for many
young women and men. Looking at the
transition to adulthood in aging societies,
Fussell (2002) attributed both later and less
childbearing to more insecurities for men and
more labour force participation for women.
However, these economic relationships are not
always simple. For instance, Smith (1999)
observed that on some questions, such as the
contractual protection of employees, insecurity
has been reduced. What may have especially
increased is people’s aversion to risk (Hall,
2002). It has also become much more
acceptable to refer to a lack of security as the
reason for not having children. Just as there is
not a simple relationship between economic
security and childbearing trends, the relation
between fertility and labour force participation
is not straightforward. We often pay attention
to the period 1960 to 1975 when there were
clearly reductions in fertility and increases in
women’s labour force participation (Beaujot and
Kerr, 2004: 87). However, women’s education
and labour force participation were increasing in
the 1950s, when fertility was also rising. The
period since 1975 has seen reasonably stable
fertility but continued increases in labour force
participation.
The relationship between labour force
participation and childbearing probably involves
two models. In a model that was more relevant
to older cohorts, women with less labour
market integration were more likely to have
children. However, in younger cohorts, women
may delay childbearing until they are better
integrated in the labour force and, consequently,
it would be the women who are better
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integrated in the labour market who would be
having children. This model is encouraged by
provisions for parental leave and child care,
which are not oriented to women who are not
employed. Certain occupations are more
conducive to the second model, with women in
education or nursing having more flexibility to
have a child compared to those in law or
engineering. In a qualitative study based on
women who graduated from university in 1985,
Ranson (1998) found that those in education
could take advantage of leaves, and guaranteed
return to their employment, while women in law
or business found they had to concentrate on
their careers to the point that they had put off
childbearing.
For women, data from the 1998 Survey of
Labour and Income Dynamics suggest that the
economic advantages associated with delaying
parenthood have increased for younger
generations of mothers (Drolet, 2002). This
study found no significant association between
the timing of marriage and wages, but the
timing of parenthood does make a difference
for women’s wages. Controlling for other
things, the wages of women who had their
children later did not differ from those who had
no children, but women who had their children
earlier than the average for their level of
education had lower average wages. Women
who delayed their births had accumulated more
years of full-time work experience (Drolet,
2003).
Lone Parenthood

Family life among Canadians constantly
changes, as influenced by the aforementioned
trends in union formation and childbearing.
Since the 1970s, the prevalence of lone
parenthood has risen, as shaped by recent
trends in cohabitation (which is less stable than
marriage, even with the presence of children),
non-marital fertility, divorce, and separation.
For example, in considering recent census data,
the proportion of all families with children who
involve a lone parent increased from one in five
families in 1991 (20 percent) to about one in
four families by 2001 (24.7 percent). Yet the
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proportion of all such families that involve
young mothers simultaneously declined, largely
consistent with recent trends in delayed
childbearing.
Whereas 9.9 percent of all lone-parent families
involved a parent under the age of 25 in 1991,
this fell to about 7.1 percent by 2001. Among all
female lone parents the proportion where the
mother is under the age of 29, dropped from
about one in four families in 1991 (24.4 percent)
to fewer than one in five by 2002 (18.3 percent).
Teenage fertility has fallen to unprecedented
lows in Canada, as has fertility among women in
their early 20s, particularly if they are without a
partner. As the timing of parenthood can have a
major impact on the life chances of the young,
an increasing proportion of young women are
in a position to act accordingly. As a result,
many pregnancies to young women in Canada
are aborted; for every 100 live births to
teenagers in Canada, aged 15-19 in 2003, there
was a reported 120 abortions. For young
women without partners, these ratios are even
higher.
Lone-parent families headed by women are
among the most economically vulnerable in
Canada, as is true in several other developed
societies. For example, using Statistics Canada’s
low-income cutoffs, Myles et al. (2006)
documented a low-income rate of about 48
percent in 2000. Yet in charting low-income
rates over recent censuses, this low-income rate
has actually fallen from about 56 percent at the
time of the 1991 Census. Rising education and
employment levels among lone parents has had
a noticeable impact on the economic resources
available to them, as labour force participation
rates have risen, particularly during the
economic recovery of the latter 1990s.
Nonetheless, for young mothers, Myles et al.
(2006) documented little change in their
economic circumstances, despite the gains made
by older women.
Low-income rates among lone parents under 30
have remained virtually unchanged over recent
years. Consistent with trends in the labour

market as a whole, returns for younger mothers,
as indexed by weekly earnings, have actually
declined, after making adjustments for changes
in the cost of living. Despite rising education
and employment levels, low-income rates have
remained virtually unchanged. The good news is
a declining proportion of lone-parent families
involve particularly young mothers. The bad
news is that for women who continue to have
children at a relatively young age, there is a very
high likelihood of economic hardship for both
themselves and their children.
4.

Immigrant and Aboriginal
Youth

The aforementioned transitions (leaving home,
completing one’s education and entering the
labour force, establishing a union and having a
first child) continue to work well for most
young adults, albeit at a somewhat delayed age.
While there are obviously important exceptions
to this generalization, as for example, the
difficulties experienced by young lone mothers,
the majority of youth appear to do reasonably
well as they move into adult roles. Somewhat
problematic is the fact that the relative earnings
of young people have fallen behind that of older
cohorts, consistent with the idea that there is
climbing social inequality across age groups in
Canada. Yet despite this fact, there are reasons
for optimism, particularly given the major gains
that have characterized youth in terms of postsecondary education and the fact that the large
baby boom generation is starting to retire from
the labour force.
With this in mind, it is useful to return to a
fundamental research issue raised by the PRI
(2006): whether it is possible to identify some of
the drivers and impacts on vulnerable youth
populations. In this context, we briefly consider
many of the aforementioned transitions while
specifically considering the experience of
immigrant youth as well as Aboriginal youth.
These two population groups have been
identified as being particularly vulnerable to
economic hardship and persistent low income
(Hatfield, 2005). The difficult living conditions

of the Aboriginal population have been well
documented, as many of Canada’s First Nations
have never shared equally in the affluence of
Canadian society (Frideres and Gadacz, 2001;
Ponting, 1997). With regard to immigration,
while historically immigrants have done
relatively well (after an initial period of
adjustment), more recently this has been much
less the case; immigrants have faced greater
difficulties, that is, lower rates of employment
and earnings, and higher rates of income
poverty (Reitz, 2001; Li, 2003; Picot and
Sweetman, 2005).
The economic disadvantages of these
population groups may be linked either directly
or indirectly to family and life-cycle questions.
As aforementioned, establishing an independent
residence is largely seen as a critical step in the
transition to adulthood, in marking a shift from
some forms of dependence to greater economic
autonomy. Figure 5 portrays the percentage
living with parents by age, for the immigrant
population (i.e., exclusively foreign-born youth),
Aboriginal Canadians, and for comparative
purposes, all Canadians regardless of ancestry or
immigration status. In considering the
Aboriginal population, Figure 5 uses the
“Aboriginal identity” population in the 2001
Census, which includes registered Indians, nonstatus Indians, the Métis and Inuit (who selfidentify). In considering the immigrant
population, Figure 5 does not include secondgeneration Canadians born in Canada to
persons foreign born.
Figure 5 portrays a pattern that is fundamental
to many of the transitions considered in the
current context, that is, Aboriginal youth are not
nearly as likely to delay these transitions. (In this
case, they are much more likely to move out of
their parent’s home at a relatively young age.)
On the other hand, the opposite pattern is
observed among immigrants, as they are much
more likely to delay this transition relative to
both the Canadian-born as well as the
Aboriginal population. For example, among
youth aged 20, fully 84.6 percent of immigrant
youth report living with their parents, which
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compares with 75.8 percent of Canadian youth
in general, and only about one half of
Aboriginal youth in 2001 (55.7 percent). These
differences in home leaving patterns are quite
pronounced, suggesting that the paths of
Aboriginal and immigrant youth in establishing
adult roles differ quite noticeably from that of
other Canadians.

career patterns, as the young are less capable in
meeting the demands of both education and
employment. The differences are quite striking
in comparing these populations, as for example,
fully one in five Aboriginal youth aged 18 had
already moved out of their parent’s home,
which compares with only one in fourteen
among immigrants.

Figure 5: Percentage Living with
Parents by Age, Canada, 2001

Figure 6 portrays the percentage studying full
time, again by age for these three distinct
population groups. As was the case with home
leaving, Aboriginal Canadians leave their studies
at a significantly younger age than is true for
other Canadians, whereas immigrant youth are
more likely to continue with their education.
For example, by age 18 less than half of
Aboriginal youth report studying full time
(49.4 percent), which compares with 67.5
percent of Canadians overall and 78.9 per cent
of immigrant youth. Aboriginal youth are far
less likely to complete their high school relative
to other Canadian youth, a problem which is
particularly acute with registered Indians and
the Inuit. Beavon and Guimond (2006)
provided statistics from the 2001 Census
suggesting that up to one half of all youth who
are registered Indians in Canada fail to obtain
their high school certificate. On the other hand,
immigrant youth are slightly more likely than
the Canadian born to obtain post-secondary
education, which is consistent with the selective
nature of Canada’s immigration policy and the
levels of education among immigrants.

Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use Files, 2001 Canadian
Census.

Different factors likely play out here, depending
on whether we focus on Aboriginal or
immigrant youth. An obvious question with
regard to immigrant youth is whether this delay
in leaving home is a deliberate strategy allowing
them to invest longer in themselves, or
alternatively, the by-product of obstacles faced
in establishing themselves in independent
households. By delaying home leaving, it is
possible to profit longer from transfers from
parents, both in terms of their financial and
human capital. On the other hand, among
Aboriginal youth, the obvious question that
surfaces is related; that is, the extent to which
Aboriginal youth experience the opposite
situation, losing out in terms of these transfers,
given their propensity to leave their parents
home as teenagers. In certain contexts, early
home leaving has been linked with lower
educational attainment and less successful
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Figure 6: Percentage Studying Full
Time by Age, Canada, 2001

Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use Files, 2001 Canadian
Census.

Figure 7 portrays the percentage working full
time, again by age and for these three distinct
population groups, suggesting that the transition
from school into the labour market also varies
noticeably. Consistent with expectations, given
that Aboriginal youth are more likely to leave
school early, they are also more likely to work
full time as adolescents. Also consistent with the
data on home leaving and education, immigrant
youth show lower participation rates in the
labour force across all ages, suggesting delays in
making the school-to-work transition. As this
subpopulation of youth includes both recent
immigrants as well as those who have been in
Canada for many years, the educational
qualifications (Canadian versus foreign trained)
and linguistic abilities (fluency in English
and/or French) varies considerably which, in
turn, may at least partially explain some
differences. New immigrants to Canada are
more likely to experience unemployment
and/or relatively low wages in obtaining a job,
despite being better educated than other
Canadians.
To the extent that immigrant youth obtain their
education in Canada, they can expect stronger
economic value for this education (Hum and
Simpson, 1999). Richmond (1989) pointed out
long ago that many of the social costs of
immigration are born by immigrants themselves:
housing problems, language barriers, nonrecognition of credentials, experience of racial
prejudice and discrimination, and frustrated
expectations for upward mobility. Among First
Nations in Canada, there are similar dynamics at
play in terms of discrimination and frustrated
expectations for upward mobility. Yet many
Aboriginal youth face economic obstacles due
to the geographic and economic isolation of
many First Nations communities and reserves,
often in economically depressed and less
developed regions of the country. While
Aboriginal youth are more likely to work full
time as teenagers relative to other Canadians, as
they move into their 20s they become
significantly less likely to be employed full time.

Figure 7: Percentage Working Full Time
by Age, Canada, 2001

Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use Files, 2001 Canadian
Census.

As there are significant differences in terms of
home leaving and the school-to-work transition,
so too there are somewhat predictable
differences documented in terms of marriage,
cohabitation, and childbearing (see Table 3). As
Aboriginal youth are considerably more likely to
finish school and leave their parent’s home at a
relatively young age, so too they are more likely
to form a union or have a first child. By the age
of 20, fully 20.6 percent of Aboriginal youth
report cohabiting or being married, which
compares with only 8.8 percent among
Canadians in general and 6.3 percent among
immigrants. As an indicator of differences in
fertility by age, Table 3 also provides
information on the percentage of women who
report living with at least one child under the
age of 5. In this regard, some differences are
striking; as for example, by age 20, fully 27.1
percent of Aboriginal youth report living with a
child under the age of 5, which compares with
only 3.9 percent of immigrants and 5.8 percent
of all Canadians.
The fertility outcomes of Aboriginal Canadians
continue to be quite distinct, particularly among
the Inuit and Status Indians, and to a lesser
extent, among non-Status Indians and the Métis
(Norris, 2000; Romaniuc, 2000). Aboriginal
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Table 3: Percentage who are Married or Cohabitating
Age
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

All Canadians
0.1
0.3
0.8
2.1
4.7
8.8
13.5
18.6
25.7
32.4
39.2
45.2
51.8
55.9
60.5

Immigrants
0.3
0.5
0.9
1.4
4.2
6.3
9.0
15.3
20.5
28.1
36.1
39.1
49.5
54.0
60.0

Aboriginal Identity
0.4
1.5
3.0
6.7
11.2
20.6
23.3
29.3
35.8
42.3
46.4
45.7
52.2
53.6
57.0

Percentage of Women with at Least One Child Aged Five or Under
Age
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

All Canadians
0.3
0.3
1.0
1.9
3.5
5.8
8.3
10.5
15.6
20.2
23.1
26.3
30.2
33.3
35.4

Immigrants
0.3
0.3
0.9
1.5
2.6
3.9
6.6
8.3
13.2
18.9
22.2
24.1
30.4
32.5
36.6

Aboriginal Identity
1.1
3.0
5.6
9.5
18.5
27.1
33.9
32.6
38.1
40.6
41.5
33.6
36.5
35.6
37.5

Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use Files, Canadian Census, 1991, 2001.

peoples in Canada begin childbearing at a
younger age than other Canadians, have higher
completed fertility, a high rate of natural
increase and, consequently, an age structure that
is considerably younger than that of other
Canadians. Immigrants to Canada, on the other
hand, have fertility outcomes that do not differ
dramatically from other Canadians, despite
some widely held myths that assumed that
immigrants have particularly large families with
many children. If anything, Table 3 suggests
that there is a slight propensity among new
Canadians to delay first births, as the proportion
of women under 30 living with a child aged
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under 5 is consistently lower than in the other
population groups. Malenfant and Bélanger
(2006) documented a tendency for fertility
behaviour of immigrants to converge toward
Canadian norms, particularly among women
who immigrated before the age of 15, and who
therefore received part of their education in
Canada. Again, this delay may reflect a
combination of factors, as new immigrants to
Canada face, on average, greater obstacles in
establishing themselves, a situation that appears
to have worsened recently. Yet more generally,
it does make sense that immigrant youth delay
both unions and childbearing in this context,

while investing in their education, as there is
considerable economic uncertainty in the
Canadian economy and a climbing demand for
advanced skills. To the extent that time is spent
in acquiring more education and skills before
getting married or having children, then one can
well argue that there are more benefits than
costs.
5.

Consequences of Delayed
Life Transitions

In reviewing past research published on
Canadian youth, there is much more on the
causes of the delay in early life transitions than
the consequences. Perhaps an important factor
responsible for this is that the scientific method
is better suited for deciphering causes than
outlining possible consequences. Discussions of
consequences often become quite speculative,
and thus driven by the basic values of the
investigator. A discussion of future
consequences of current change is inherently
approximate and does not easily lend itself to
the scientific method. Even the Scientific Panel
on Transitions to Adulthood of the
International Union on the Scientific Study of
Population tends to shy away from looking at
implications.
One approach to the study of consequences
using the scientific method is to choose a given
implication and examine the possible
determinants of that specific consideration. For
example, consider the concern by some that the
tendency among young adults to delay early life
transitions may lead them to earn much less in
terms of lifetime earnings, and subsequently
have less accumulated investments by the time
they retire, usually by age 65. In this context,
one could attempt to approach this issue
scientifically by studying the determinants of
accumulated investments by age 65, including
the impact of late transitions among other
considerations. Morissette (2002) conducted
research that is similar yet perhaps more
manageable in the current context, by
examining the impact of late transitions on
cumulative earnings to ages 26-35 rather than

retirement age. Very briefly, he found clear and
decisive evidence of deteriorating cumulative
earnings, as associated with some of the more
fundamental trends already highlighted in the
current report, including higher proportions
attending school full time as well as lower
proportions of non-student men working full
time, and declines in men’s earnings. Yet as to
the longer term implications of these delays,
particularly in terms of investments by age 65,
there is obviously much uncertainty as to the
future earnings of these younger cohorts,
particularly given that many young people have
invested heavily in education.
From the political economy perspective, the
main reason for late transitions must be that
youth lack opportunities. Yet this view is
undermined by the observation that some
population groups that also lack opportunities
react by rushing rather than delaying these same
transitions. As an example, consider the two
vulnerable populations as discussed in the
previous section: Aboriginal peoples in Canada,
who appear to be particularly rushed, and
immigrants to Canada, who are more likely to
delay. In turn, while late transitions may pose
certain disadvantages at the aggregate level, the
same may also be true in terms of early
transitions.
According to Kaplan’s theory of the life course,
the timing of transitions involves trade-offs.
Late transitions in this conception would
promote greater quality of children, but it may
mean no children, particularly as fecundity
declines with age. Waiting longer to reproduce
allows greater investment in oneself before
investing in reproduction; thus, it allows one to
invest more in one’s offspring. But delay may
mean that reproduction never occurs.
Considering the broader societal context,
Canada has been witnessing unprecedented low
fertility, with Canada’s total fertility rate
hovering at only about 1.5 births per woman.
Annual births in Canada have steadily fallen for
well over a decade: down almost 20 percent,
from about 403,280 in 1989 to 327,187 in 2001
(Statistics Canada, 2003). The last time Canada
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recorded so few births was over 60 years ago, as
the number of births was below the 320,000
mark back in the early 1940s.
Later transitions enable more transfers from
parents to children, but this may reduce the
potential for the parents to invest in their own
retirement. That is, persons making later
transitions are likely to benefit from more
parental and community resources, and thus
enter work life later but better equipped. It
remains an empirical question to determine if
they have sufficient time in their lives to benefit
fully from this stronger human capital. Yet
again, some population groups are particularly
disadvantaged, while simultaneously rushing
rather than delaying these same transitions. In
reference to disadvantaged populations in the
United States, Goldscheider and Goldscheider
(1999: 209-210) pointed out that leaving home
at a very young age, particularly when this does
not involve attending school, has a variety of
negative consequences for establishing
successful career patterns and stable families.
Co-residence provides greater subsidies than are
provided through financial support for
independent living. In this regard, then, recent
trends toward delay in the Canadian context can
be considered advantageous.
Bernhardt (1999) and her colleagues further
summarized that leaving home early can pose
problems for completing high school,
establishing savings, and testing new
relationships. It is also linked to lower
educational aspirations and attainment. In turn,
youth from more affluent families are more
likely to leave home to further their education,
more likely to delay their career paths, and less
likely to enter unstable relationships, such as
cohabitation and early marriages. In contrast,
parental family structures that are not intact,
such as lone-parent families and step-families,
lead to early home leaving, the early formation
of relationships, and decreased investment in
education (Bernhardt et al., 2003). With this in
mind, it is noted that Aboriginal youth are much
more likely to live in lone-parent families, just as
they are more likely to be part of a step-family,
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as economic resources are often scarce and
housing conditions poor. As demonstrated in
the previous section, Aboriginal youth are also
noted for their particularly early transitions in
establishing their own households and
relationships, and are noted for having much
higher levels of teenage fertility and childbearing
early into adulthood.
The implications of delayed life transitions for
adolescents and youth depend critically on the
extent to which the extra time is used to
accumulate human and financial capital. Among
persons with low skills, there is some evidence
in the United States that the rotation across jobs
is not building their human capital (Klerman
and Karoly, 1994). In earlier times, young men
with limited education would largely be married
parents and they would need to stay with their
job. But if the instability in employment is
better interpreted as “churn” rather than the
acquisition of human capital through mobility
across jobs, then their time is wasted rather than
being used productively. Without the pressure
of marriage and parenthood, some young
people seem to spend a lot of time “deciding”
how they want to face adult life. It can be
argued that delayed home leaving and late entry
into full-time work means a delay in
participation in society as a full citizen.
If time is spent acquiring more education and
skills, or getting established before having
children, then one can well argue that there are
more benefits than costs. However, this
argument is based on the experience of past
cohorts, which may not apply to the future. A
much larger proportion of youth continue with
post-secondary education, such that it has
become the norm that young adults attempt to
obtain a college and/or university education. In
particular, those who delayed among older
generations were very selective, typically
spending considerable time and energy in
obtaining an education that was arguably of
higher standards (Côté and Allahar, 2007). To
the extent that this investment has paid off, they
are likely to have benefited from their delays
relative to others in their cohort. This is not

necessarily going to be the case in the future, as
college or university credentials become more
widespread. As aforementioned, there is already
considerable evidence of underemployment
among university graduates in Canada today.
In asking people about the best time to have
children, a certain number of people say that
one should not wait too long, to have the
necessary energy and patience, and to minimize
the gap between parents and children.
Observing that later childbearing is more likely
to involve a first child or an only child, MarcilGratton (1988) noted that the parents are more
likely to be inexperienced at taking care of
children, and the child is less likely to have the
advantage of an older brother or sister from
whom one can learn. While only children also
have advantages, such as the undivided
attention of parents, respondents in a qualitative
survey often mentioned the concern of not
having lived in a close interpersonal
environment with someone of one’s own age,
which could be important to establishing marital
relationships (Beaujot and Bélanger, 2001).
From the point of view of young children,
delayed childbearing comes with the advantages
of parents who are more mature, with more
financial and human capital, but with the
possible disadvantages of less sibling
interaction, and a larger age gap with their
parents.
Given that the delay in parenting has permitted
more education, Lochhead (2000) found
increasing socio-economic disparities between
younger and older parents. More specifically,
Lochhead documented some evidence of
increased polarization of opportunities and
results between the majority of young people
who postpone major life transitions (and in
particular, the birth of a first child) relative to
those who choose a “fast track.” Some authors
have specifically spoken of a bifurcation of
models in terms of early and late childbearing.
Based on census data, Lochhead (2000) found
that delayed childbearing is more pronounced
among women who have a university education,
and there are increasing income differentials to

the disadvantage of younger first-time mothers,
even in two-parent families. Using data from
the United States, Martin (2000) noted that
delayed childbearers, who tend to have more
education, are increasingly likely to raise their
children in intact marriages, while early
childbearers are more likely to raise children
outside of marriage. Canadian data also indicate
that women under 30 who are formerly married
are much more likely to have children than
those who are single, cohabiting, or married
(Ravanera, 1995: 18).
Some selective evidence from the Canadian
Census (comparing 1991 with 2001) provides
similar evidence that there are climbing
disparities between young adults who are on the
“fast track” relative to those who delay a first
birth. Figures 8 and 9 portray this quite well, by
focusing exclusively on women who report
having at least one child under the age of 5.
Systematic comparisons are made between
mothers aged 20-24 and those aged 25-29, in
1991 and 2001 respectively. Figure 8 shows the
percentage of women with young children
(aged 0-5) employed full time in 1991 and in
2001, showing that the women who delay
childbearing are more likely to be employed, in
both censuses. Yet consistent with this idea of
an increased bifurcation of conditions, the
differences as observed between the two age
groups in 2001 were greater than in 1991. For
example, in 1991, 41.5 percent of all women
aged 20-24 and 47.7 percent of women aged 2529 were working full time, which shifted to 38.4
and 50.5 percent respectively, in 2001. In other
words, older women were more likely to be
working in 2001, whereas younger women were
less likely.
Figure 9 provides similar comparisons, yet
shifting attention to the percentage of women
who report raising children alone as lone
parents. While 24.5 percent of the younger
mothers (aged 20-24) were raising children
alone in 1991, this climbed to 36.8 percent by
2001. The corresponding change as observed
for older women was not nearly as pronounced,
shifting from 12.7 percent in 1991 to 16.2
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percent by 2001. A similar situation, with
widening disparities, was observed with other
fundamental census variables, such as
education, low income, and median income.
While a declining proportion of all women have
their first birth before the age of 25 years, those
who continue to do so appear to be increasingly
selective and disadvantaged on several
dimensions. Although not presented here,
similar patterns were also observed for young
fathers on this “fast track.”
Figure 8: Percentage of Women with
Child 0-5 Who Are Working Full Time,
1991, 2001

Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use File, Canadian
Census, 1991, 2001.

Documenting similar trends in the United
States, Bianchi (2000) noted a bifurcation of
models, as young families seem to be
increasingly disadvantaged relative to families
established by parents who have delayed
marriage and first birth. As a result, children are
a differential parental investment. Children born
from mature parents are more likely to have the
advantages of a mother with more human
capital, along with the presence of a father in a
dual-income family, which contrasts with the
greater likelihood of lone parenthood for those
who parent early. Most studies see advantages
for individuals who delay, relative to the
remainder of their cohort. In their study of early
life transitions of Canadians, Ravanera and her
colleagues (1998, 2002) found that the delay in
family formation is more likely to occur for
persons with more opportunities. For instance,
the timing of first marriage is later for women
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who worked before marriage, for those with
more education, and for those whose mother
had more education.
It is particularly important that gender questions
be properly theorized in interpreting the
consequences of delayed transitions. As
repeatedly documented, younger men in
particular do poorly in the labour market
compared to men of previous generations. For
younger women, it is their education that has
particularly advanced, and once they are in the
labour market, they do well compared to
women of earlier generations. Yet relative to
younger men, younger women continue to
experience lower earnings and a higher
likelihood of economic hardship, at least
partially related to the fact that they are more
likely to raise children alone. Clearly, men and
women are not independent of each other,
neither in the labour market nor in families. In
the labour market, young men have had the
disadvantage of following the baby boom
cohort who took the best jobs and of having to
compete with well-educated women (Beaujot,
2002). At the level of couples, most now adopt
the two-worker model, and thus women’s gains
compensate for men’s losses. Given women’s
greater contributions to earnings, it may even be
that men do not need to devote themselves as
fully to maximizing their own earnings, and they
can do a greater share of the caring side of
maintaining a family. Young men and women
who enter into conjugal relationships in which
both partners are employed have various
advantages. Besides being based on later
marriage, the two-worker model is based on
later childbearing. The cost of children is more
likely to be shared if children arrive after the
wife’s career is established. The husband in the
two-earner model will better recognize his
partner’s economic potential, and be more
willing to make accommodations. The same
may apply to the workplace, which is more
likely to make accommodations for the
childbearing of workers who have more
seniority.

Figure 9: Percentage of Women with
Child 0-5 Who Are Lone Parents, 1991,
2001

Source: Statistics Canada, Public Use File, Canadian
Census, 1991, 2001.

As aforementioned, the broader context for
these delayed transitions has been the so-called
second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe,
1995), which has meant greater plurality and
diversity in the family life of Canadians. As with
these delayed transitions, the second
demographic transition has had important
implications for women, men, and children,
some for the better and some for the worse. For
women, it has meant major gains in education
and opportunities in the labour force; however,
the increased instability of relationships means
that, compared to men, they are more likely to
raise children alone. That is, they are less likely
to have the support of a partner, and are more
likely to care for dependent children. On the
other hand, while men are delaying
relationships, marriage and childbearing, they
are also less likely to have lifelong relationships
of emotional exchange with their children. For
children, it means older parents yet less stability
in parenting. Regardless of the delay transitions
of young Canadians, many of these additional
transformations in family life have some rather
important consequences on the well-being of
young and old alike.

with more focus on self-centred fulfillment and
greater flexibility in the entry and exit from
unions. Given the need for both men and
women to be economically independent, it
makes sense that unions and childbearing are
delayed as education is completed and work
lives established. Given the economic
uncertainty and the needs for advanced skills, it
also makes sense that people are longer in
education, and later in starting their first fulltime employment. The economic uncertainties
faced by men, partly because they compete with
equally educated women, have brought delays in
union formation. The uncertainties in men’s
work lives, and the stronger labour force
participation of women, have made it difficult
to fit children into busy lives, thus bringing
delays in reproduction and higher proportions
without children. With the focus on self-centred
fulfillment, there is less attention to the
enduring fulfillment that comes from children
and family.
With this, perhaps the strongest negative at the
societal level is lower fertility and the resultant
population aging, which is expected, inevitably,
to escalate as we move further into the 21st
century. Accommodations to population aging
will be complex, and will in all likelihood be one
of the most fundamental societal challenges
over the next several decades. Population aging
affects a number of policy questions ranging
from pensions and other transfers, through to
health care and labour market issues. As
Canadian youth avoid and delay fundamental
adult transitions well into their later 20s and
into their early 30s, a growing proportion either
intentionally or non-intentionally have less than
desired fertility, contributing to a major
contraction occurring at the bottom of Canada’s
age structure. This contraction, without a major
rebound in the fertility rate, can only contribute
to an acceleration in the pace of population
aging.

Fertility is down to an unprecedented low in
Canada, as childbearing occurs at older ages.
This is perhaps the core feature of the second
demographic transition, which includes new
understandings regarding family relationships,
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6.

Conclusion and Policy
Implications

Various social, demographic, and economic
changes have altered the life experience of the
young, which has modified the opportunities
and risks encountered in moving toward
adulthood. The objective of this report was to
describe some of the most salient of these
changes, with a review of existing Canadian
literature. Of particular interest were some of
the most fundamental changes in the life course,
in terms of later home leaving, later completion
of education, delayed full-time entrance into the
labour force, later union formation, and later
childbearing. Correspondingly, we were also
interested in some of the consequences of these
changes, including policy implications.
The delays as observed over the last several
decades are in marked contrast to the situation
observed earlier, where transitions were
occurring at increasingly younger average ages.
In particular, cohorts that came of age during
the 1950s and 1960s in Canada experienced a
transition to adulthood that was much more
compressed into a relatively short period of
completing formal education, entering the
labour force, leaving home, establishing a
nuclear household and having a first child. For
subsequent cohorts, not only has this
standardization broken down, but the early lifecourse transitions have extended over a longer
period, the sequencing is more diverse and
events themselves are less clearly defined. These
changes carry profound implications for society,
as young adults take longer to establish
themselves residentially, economically, as well as
to form their own families. This is even more
complicated by the simple fact that transitions
to adulthood also appear to be less permanent
and more subject to reversibility that in the past,
as these transitions are often prolonged,
complex, fragmented, and non-linear in nature.
Clearly, many of these delays are interrelated, as
for example, Canadian youth are far more likely
to live at home if they continue to study full
time, are not employed, are single, childless, and
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have relatively low earnings. Given changes in
the character of Canada’s economy over recent
decades and a climbing demand for high skills,
it makes sense that the young spend more time
in education, and are later in starting their first
full-time employment. In turn, given the
pressures on young men and women to
establish themselves economically, it makes
sense that unions and childbearing be delayed
somewhat as education is completed and work
lives established. Yet in this context, it is noted
that the patterns as observed in Canada are not
universal across western societies, as
comparative research has suggested a number of
different “transition regimes” (Van de Velde,
2006; Walther, 2006). For that matter, as
demonstrated in the current text, the nature of
these patterns also varies considerably across
different subpopulations within Canada, as was
demonstrated by comparing early life transitions
among Aboriginal Canadians and late transitions
for immigrant youth. Even further, the nature
of these transitions varies considerably across
regions of the country, as for example,
cohabitation in Quebec is now extremely
widespread relative to other parts of the
country.
Transitions between youth and adulthood are
structured by a complex system of socioeconomic structures, institutional arrangements,
and cultural patterns that can vary in an
important manner across nation states. Building
on the work of Esping-Andersen (1990), Van de
Velde (2006) provided a framework or typology
of transitional regimes, which demonstrates
how youth transitions have taken on multiple
pathways across different societies. For
example, Van de Velde contrasted the
institutional arrangements and cultural patterns
of the social democracies of Northern Europe
(e.g., Denmark and Sweden) with the experience
of youth in the more conservative welfare states
in southern Europe (e.g., Spain and Italy). In
addition, it is possible to contrast the liberalism
of the United Kingdom with the more regulated
economies of continental Europe (e.g., France
and Germany). As argued, this broader context
can potentially provide some insight as to why

transitions tend to be more prolonged in certain
settings while being relatively short in others.
Different types of welfare states arguably have
important ramifications for the
institutionalization of youth transitions. Welfare
states shape the level of government assistance
available to youth and their families, not to
mention the potential recourse available to them
in making the often difficult transition into the
labour market. With the Nordic model, Van de
Velde (2006) referred to Denmark’s
comprehensive school system (which is noted
for its flexibility in encouraging higher
education), its relatively generous social
transfers (including those directed toward
youth), its universal system of child care, high
rates of female employment, and extended
public sector. In reviewing statistics on life-cycle
transitions, Denmark is characterized by a
relatively early independence for young adults,
delayed and extended education, high levels of
cohabitation, and an apparent tolerance for a
relatively long period of self-exploration. In
contrast, the Southern European situation is
one whereby the state takes on a much lesser
role, the economic opportunities for the young
(and young women in particular) are more
restricted, gender roles are more traditional,
intergenerational solidarity is often high, and
both the family and informal work play a pivotal
role in the transition to adulthood. As a result,
fundamental life transitions are often delayed.
For example, in both Spain and Italy there is
often a very late departure from the parental
home. Due to economic weaknesses throughout
much of southern Europe and high levels of
youth unemployment, transitions are structured
by a long waiting phase, with delayed marriage
and childbearing until one can best afford the
financial and time costs involved.
Contrasts can be made across countries where
home leaving is later and children depend on
transfers within the family (as in Southern
Europe), and earlier transitions given the
availability of more state transfers, as in Nordic
countries (Reher, 1998; Breen and Buchmann,
2002; Iacovou, 2002). For cohorts born around

1960, the median age at men’s home leaving
ranges from 26 or 27 years in Italy and Spain, to
20 years in Sweden (Billari et al., 2001).
Independence from parents at affordable costs
is reduced when there is a poor housing market
and a lack of rental accommodation. In
contrast, greater social transfers to young
people, as occurs in Northern Europe, allows
more independence from parents. The longerterm consequences are not minor, as for
example, fertility has fallen to very low levels in
the south, as associated with delayed fertility
(with total fertility rates hovering at only 1.2 in
both Italy and Spain). In addition, McDonald
(1997) suggested that childbearing appears to be
particularly low in societies where women may
aspire for equal status (in education and in the
labour force), but where mothers carry an
excessive burden within the family (a situation
that seems to characterize both Italy and Spain).
Faced with a choice between higher status in the
labour force and low status in families, women
are prompted to have “no families” (Chesnais,
1996; Goldscheider and Waite, 1991). Again, the
longer-term consequences are obvious in terms
of slowing demographic growth and dramatic
population aging.
In drawing further comparisons, Van de Velde
(2006) made reference to the liberal model that
characterizes the United Kingdom, as one that
values individual rights and responsibilities
more than collective provisions. Relative to
other countries in Europe, the United Kingdom
has a less-regulated labour market, lower levels
of investment in child care, and a higher priority
placed on private responsibility in facing social
risks. In many regards, the liberalism of the
United Kingdom resembles that of North
America, yet in examining youth transitions, the
United Kingdom is characterized by a much
earlier independence (relative to Canada, for
example). This is true of leaving home,
establishing marital unions and labour market
integration. With fewer transfers from the state
(in contrast to the Nordic model) and fewer
opportunities for higher education (in contrast
to North America), youth in the United
Kingdom have responded with transitions that
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occur at a relatively young age. Yet also relevant
in this context is the much lower level of youth
unemployment in the United Kingdom – at 7.9
percent for young adults aged 20-24 in 2004
(UNECE, 2006). This compares with fully 21
percent unemployed in Italy and 19.9 percent in
Spain. With an emphasis placed on individual
initiative and responsibility in a context whereby
there are economic opportunities, young adults
seem to adapt with relatively short transitions,
quick to establish themselves in the labour force
(sometimes via a combination of work and
study) and in relationships.
The continental model (France, Germany) has
highly regulated and standardized labour
markets, an emphasis on vocational training,
non-flexibility in terms of educational path, and
social assistance programs that are somewhat
more generous than those in the United
Kingdom and North America. Yet in this
context, Van de Velde described youth
transitions that are relatively long with a gradual
path to independence. These transitions are
noted for their linearity in terms of education,
ongoing difficulties with labour market
integration, and semi-dependent situations that
involve financial support from both parents and
government. Again, while youth unemployment
is high throughout much of Europe, it also
remains stubbornly high in France and
Germany (at 20.4 and 13.3 percent respectively,
in 2004). Subsequently, as young people have
difficulties in establishing themselves in the
labour market, they often experience a
prolonged period of independent role
exploration. In this context, public policy
initiatives are often quite supportive of the
young, particularly via direct transfers to young
adults who establish themselves in families.
With declining rates of population growth and
population aging, both France and Germany
responded with policy initiatives that recognize
the importance of supporting young families
and, in particular, introduced policy initiatives
that are essentially pronatalist in orientation.
While Canada has yet to experience the extent
of population aging and slowing demographic
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growth as characteristic of much of Europe, it
does hold the potential for further fertility
decline. As a liberal democracy, youth
transitions are not nearly as short as in the
United Kingdom, at least partially due to the
high proportion of youth who pursue postsecondary education. As aforementioned, many
young adults complete their post-secondary
studies with significant debt, while the problem
of underemployment for both college and
university graduates is real, and apparently
growing in magnitude (Côté and Allahar, 2007).
While youth unemployment might not be quite
as high as in much of Europe, the opportunities
available to youth with a low level of education
have worsened. Youth transitions are
increasingly delayed, at least partially the byproduct of blocked opportunities to establish
independent households. The downward
pressure in terms of earnings (for young men in
particular) is consistent with the idea that
difficult economic conditions contribute to this
increased propensity to delay. There is further
potential for fertility decline (below a current
total fertility rate of 1.5), as for example, if the
age-specific fertility rates of young women in
Canada fall to levels recorded in some of the
low-fertility countries of Europe. It is becoming
increasingly obvious to young men and women
in Canada that early childbearing without first
establishing oneself economically can mean
long-term disadvantages, which could very well
lead to a further fertility decline into the future.
Bianchi (2000) noted the advantages of delaying
home leaving, marriage, and childbearing, to the
extent that young adults invest in their human
capital. Yet in reference to the situation in the
United States, she also spoke of a bifurcation of
models, as young families seem to be
increasingly disadvantaged relative to families
established by parents who have delayed
marriage and first birth. Children born from
mature parents are more likely to have the
advantages of a mother with more human
capital, along with the presence of a father in a
dual-income family, which contrasts with the
greater likelihood of lone parenthood for those
who parent early. In the current study, we see

clear evidence from the 1991 and 2001 censuses
to suggest an increased polarization of
opportunities between the majority of young
people who seem to postpone major life
transitions (and in particular, the birth of a first
child) relative to those who choose a “fast
track.” In considering mothers with at least one
child under the age of 5, the relative
disadvantages of those who start family life
earlier (e.g., before the age of 25) seems to have
worsened somewhat over recent years relative
to those who have their first child at an older
age.
Some authors have specifically spoken of a
bifurcation of models in terms of early and late
childbearing. In elaborating on the links
between demographic and socio-economic
vulnerability, Kiernan (2002) observed a “long
arm of demography” in the sense that family
demographics are differentiated based on the
extent to which individuals are disadvantaged,
and this selectivity has further implications for
subsequent vulnerability. With this bifurcation,
we see evidence of rising inequality across
younger and older families. Similarly, Morissette
(2002) documented rising inequality across age
groups in Canada, as young workers fall behind
older ages, as recent cohorts face greater
economic difficulties than did older cohorts. In
considering the relationship between
demographics and disadvantage, Kiernan (2002)
paid particular attention to youthful
parenthood, unmarried families, and parental
separation and divorce, as further aggravating
the economic difficulties as experienced by
youth. In a sense, Kiernan’s work demonstrates
the utility of longitudinal analysis, following
cohorts over an extended period, considering
how socio-economic vulnerability might be
passed from one generation to the next.
In summary, many of the implications of these
delays appear to be positive, at least in the
Canadian context. By leaving home later,
children receive more transfers from their
parents; by staying in education longer, youth
are better prepared for a world where the labour
force grows much more slowly and we need to

depend on the quality of workers. Two-worker
families reduce the dependence of women on
men, and reduce the exposure of women and
children to the risks associated with family
instability. Yet at the individual level, there are
also negative implications, as for example,
people may not have saved enough during a
shorter work life, partly because they entered
full-time work later, partly because children
have spent more time in education, and have
been slow in establishing their financial
independence and leaving home. Yet the
strongest negatives may very well be at the
societal level, because delayed early life
transitions bring lower fertility and population
aging.
It could be that our institutions have become
too focused on supporting dependants at later
ages, including personal and collective
investments to support a long retirement
period. To ensure that younger persons can
become reproductive, we may need to work out
better transfers toward the young at ages
beyond the teen years. Aging societies are
tempted to pay particular attention to the aged,
which can undermine the very potential for
reproduction and renewal. We should not
ignore policies that apply particularly to people
at ages where they are making these early lifecourse transitions. Greater societal investments
in post-secondary education would allow young
people to leave home sooner, and to finish their
education more efficiently without the
distraction of part-time jobs. Greater
investments in the school-to-work transition,
especially for the benefit of those who leave
school early, would reduce the uncertainties of
the initial years on the labour market. Stronger
investments in young families, including
subsidies for parental leaves, tax benefits,
reduced work hours and child care, would
enable people in this stage of life to achieve
their work and family goals.
Such investments would be based on unique
ways in which the human life course has
evolved, with a long life expectancy, and long
period of youth dependency subsidized by a
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long period of post-reproductive productivity.
As children stay at home longer, are supported
by their parents for an extended period in order
to benefit from a longer period of education
and an easier transition into the labour market,
one generation is potentially passing on benefits
to the next. It is important to recognize that
investments in the early stages of the life course
provide the best basis for long-term security.
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